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The lack of attention to any comprehensive scholarly study of King Faisal I of 
Iraq since his untimely death in 1933 is interesting, considering that the twelve years in 
which he ruled Iraq witnessed the imposition and evolution of many of the institutions of 
the twentieth century state along with their concomitant ideologies and justifications. The 
construction of the modern Iraqi state belonged solely neither to the British nor to the 
efforts of the Ottoman-educated ex-Sharifian officers who followed Faisal from his 
aborted kingdom in Syria to the newly established monarchy in 1921.  It was more a 
mélange of competing ideas, collaborative efforts, and political realities.  In all this, 
Faisal played no small part as he maneuvered delicately among the strategic concerns of 
two major European powers, a re-emergent Turkish nation, his family’s historical 
nemesis in the Nejd, relations with Iran following the 1921 coup d'état, and a variety of 
internal separatist ambitions and parochial interests.  This paper seeks to redress this 
lacuna, concentrating on Faisal’s efforts to establish a solid base of support and control 
while crafting an independent, coherently functioning polity from the patchwork of 
provinces presented him on his accession to the throne of Iraq. 
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 1 
Chapter I: Introduction 
 
The nation is not a concept belonging to natural history, to ethnology, or 
to sociology, but to politics.  Simply, as inert bodies, nations are exceedingly 
ancient, but as conscious, active units they have not existed very long.  The 
science of politics regards nations as organized masses of humanity or, as masses 
capable of organization, which detach themselves spatially from the whole body 
of mankind and mark themselves out by a unique history, language, and 
civilization,…as units that will and act.  The common exercise of power is the 
fundamental and essential object of political activity. 
--Karl Renner, Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Nationen in besonderer Anwendung auf 
Oesterreich (Leipzig, 1918) p.10. 
 
Shortly after the untimely death of King Faisal I in 1933, a play entitled The Leap 
of the Arabs was staged in Buenos Aires.  Set in Damascus in the immediate aftermath of 
the First World War, it was a typical expression of the pan-Arab nationalist sentiment 
frequently espoused outside the Arab world.  The play portrayed an idealized Faisal 
during his brief tenure as ruler in Syria, a “champion of Arabism” dauntless in pursuit of 
an independent nation united without regard to tribe, ethnicity, sect, or religion.  The 
playwright dedicated his work to Faisal’s memory and “‘to all those who believe in 
brotherhood as a creed, in equality as a code and in liberty as a religion’.”1  Faisal’s and 
T. E. Lawrence’s earlier exploits in the Arab Revolt of 1916 – 1918 were also celebrated 
during the interwar years in poetry, novels, and film.  European and American audiences 
could indulge in a steady stream of fictionalized portrayals of dashing, mounted desert 
warriors ranging from the historical to the absurdly romantic; a trend that gradually 
                                                
1 As quoted in Ali A. Allawi, Faisal I of Iraq (Yale, 2014) xxix.  
 2 
diminished in the post-WWII era only to be revived by David Lean’s 1962 epic (and 
epically flawed) Lawrence of Arabia.2 
Despite the international attention following Feisal’s early paramilitary exploits, 
and later marking his death, his legacy was muted as subsequent events in Iraq and the 
Middle East overshadowed the travails of early post-imperial and post-colonial 
governments.  Internally, the military coups of 1936 and 1941 along with the growth of 
the Communist Party and its troubled relations with the government (leading to the al-
Wathbah uprising of 1948), reflected an underlying structural dissonance that many 
attributed directly to the period of British control and, by association, to the monarchy.3 
So, too, did the emergence of the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party and its subsequent split 
from the Syrian branch, the violent and bloody overthrow of Iraq’s monarchy in 1958, 
and the even more violent coup in 1963 (the Ramadan Revolution).  The later revival of 
Shi’a Islamic ideology in the 1960s and 1970s to counter the Sunni-dominated pan-Arab 
ideology, which a majority of Shi’a associated with the Iraqi Ba’ath Party, only 
contributed to the lack of interest, if not hostility, that attempts at a retrospective 
approach to Faisal’s reign and achievements generated. 
                                                
2 One American writer produced a 65-page epic poem Feisal, The Arabian.  Lowell Thomas single-
handedly promoted Lawrence (and himself) in live shows that depicted, among other things, scantily 
dressed women dancing in front of images of the pyramids. Doubtless, the success of E. M. Hull’s 
romances owed something to the popular fascination with the desert and its inhabitants. 
3 The Wathbah uprising – ‘the most formidable mass insurrection in the history of the monarchy’ was 
sparked by the palace’s decision to renew the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930, which many critics felt ‘reduced 
Iraq to an appendage of the British Empire’. Students and workers joined in demonstrations and strikes, 
which quickly escalated into street violence that left between 300 and 400 dead. Hanna Batatu devotes an 
entire chapter to the uprising in his magnum opus, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary 
Movements in Iraq, (Princeton, 1978), Chapter 22. 
 3 
There were no comprehensive scholarly studies of Faisal, apart from one or two 
biographical works in English and Arabic in the 1930s, Zeine N. Zeine’s diplomatic 
study of Faisal’s short-lived Syrian tenure in 1960, and Gerald de Gaury’s personal 
account of the monarchy in 1961.  It wasn’t until the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988, 
when Saddam Hussein felt confident enough to begin resurrecting various historical links 
and symbols in aid of enhancing his cult of personality, that a renewed interest 
manifested in examining Faisal’s life and the role he played in the creation of modern 
Iraq.4  Various memoirs shedding light on the Mandate and early monarchical period 
were re-issued, both in Arabic as well as English, and a small number of partial 
biographies emerged dealing with critical aspects of Faisal’s life in the Hejaz, Syria, and 
Iraq. Yet no comprehensive biography of Faisal’s life appeared until 2014. 5 
The lack of attention to studies of Faisal is especially interesting considering that 
the twelve years in which he ruled Iraq witnessed the imposition and evolution of many 
of the institutions of the twentieth century state along with their concomitant ideologies 
and justifications. The construction of the modern Iraqi state belonged solely neither to 
the British nor to the efforts of the Ottoman-educated ex-Sharifian officers who followed 
Faisal to the newly established monarchy in 1921.  It was more a mélange of competing 
ideas, collaborative efforts, and political realities in which Faisal played no small part, 
                                                
4 Zeine N. Zeine, The Struggle for Arab Independence: Western Diplomacy and the Rise and Fall of 
Faisal’s Kingdom in Syria, (Beirut, 1960). Gerald de Gaury, Three Kings in Baghdad, 1921-1958 (London, 
1961 – reissued 2007). 
5 See for example, Ja’far Al-‘Askari, Mudhakkirat Ja’far Al-‘Askari, (Dar al-Laam, 1988). In English, A 
Soldier’s Story: From Ottoman Rule to Independent Iraq, (London, 2003). Tawfiq al-Suwaydi, 
Mudhakkirati, nisf qarn min tarikh al-Iraq wa al-qadiyah al-‘Arabiyah, (Beirut, 1969). In English, My 
Memoirs: Half a Century of the History of Iraq and the Arab Cause, (Boulder, 2013). Rustum Haydar, 
Mudhakkirat, (Beirut, 1988).  
 4 
maneuvering delicately among the strategic concerns of two major European powers, a 
re-emergent Turkish nation, his family’s historical nemesis in the Nejd, relations with 
Iran following the 1921 coup d'état, and a variety of internal separatist ambitions and 
parochial interests.  This paper will address Faisal’s efforts to establish a solid base of 
support and control while crafting an independent, coherently functioning polity from the 
patchwork of provinces presented him on his accession to the throne of Iraq. 
 5 
Chapter II: A National Movement? 
 
Traditionally, the impulse to nationalism in Iraq has been ascribed to a variety of 
causes and events: the foment of intellectual ideas emanating from the Islamic 
modernism of late nineteenth and early twentieth century reformers (Sayyid Jamal ad-Din 
al-Afghani, Muhammad ‘Abduh, Rashid Rida, and ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi), the 
excitement generated by the Young Turks revolution in Istanbul in 1908, the Italian 
invasion of Libya in 1911, antagonism to the British presence and administration during 
and immediately after the First World War, secret societies (Haras al-Istiqlal and an Iraqi 
branch of al-‘Ahd), President Woodrow Wilson’s enunciation of the principle of self-
determination, and the rebellion of 1920.  This last in particular has long been considered 
the seminal event in the Iraqi nationalist narrative, spawning a surprisingly large number 
of memoirs and accounts, written and oral, detailing the crucial role various people and 
groups played in this “first historical act” of the nascent Iraqi state.6 
The tendency to imbue the 1920 uprising with high revolutionary, nationalist, 
socialist, and anti-imperialist motivations likely began with T. E. Lawrence and his 
determination to discredit the India Office colonial administrators tasked with 
establishing a working government in mandatory Iraq; especially Sir Percy Cox, the 
Chief Political Officer, and Lt-Col. Sir Arnold Wilson, Cox’s deputy and acting Civil 
Commissioner from April 1918.  Neither man felt any particular admiration for 
                                                
6 Faleh Abdul-Jabar and Hosham Dawod, eds. Tribes and Power: Nationalism and Ethnicity in the Middle 
East, (London, 2003) 284. Allawi, 356-60. Philip Willard Ireland, Iraq: A Study in Political Development 
(London, 1937) 143-144. 
 6 
Lawrence, nor did they approve the opinions advocated by Mark Sykes and the Arab 
Bureau that 
 viewed with benevolence the idea of a united or federated Arabia; a Federation in 
which the Wahhabis of Najd, the Lords of Koweit and Asir, the Sunni Arabs of 
Syria and the Shi’ahs of Iraq, not to mention the usual minorities, would by some 
means unite to realize their presumed aspirations to govern each other.7  
 
Nevertheless, Lawrence’s opinions on the nature and causes of tribal rebellions found a 
ready audience seeking to couch such uprisings in the increasingly popular language of 
anti-colonialism and emergent nationalism. One writer even depicted the events of 1920 
in terms of blood, race, and that “passionate love of liberty so characteristic of the 
Bedouins.”8 
Among Iraqi writers even greater effort was expended to confer sweeping moral 
and ideological nationalist aspirations upon the uprising.  A number of accounts 
emphasized deep-rooted political and ideological involvement, a revisionist exercise that 
only intensified after the inception of the Iraqi state as competition grew for high political 
and sinecure administrative positions.9  Later such claims were used to provide additional 
luster to one’s antecedents, much in the manner of Saddam Hussein’s “historical deeds.”  
                                                
7 As quoted in, Judith Share Yaphe, “The Arab Revolt in Iraq of 1920” (Phd Diss., 1972) 78.  Lt-Col. Sir 
Arnold Talbot Wilson, (1884-1940) who spent his early military and political career in India, Iraq, and the 
Persian Gulf, dismissed Lawrence for “his beardlessness, his love of dressing and being photographed in 
long clothes.” As quoted in, Allawi, 459.  Sir Percy Cox (1864-1937), an extremely able political officer 
with lengthy experience in India, the Persian Gulf and Africa, didn’t fully trust Mark Sykes or the Arab 
Bureau’s indistinct plans for an ‘Arab government’ and worked to establish a status for Iraq separate from 
the other Middle East territories of the Ottoman Empire. Col. Sir Mark Sykes (1879-1919) served first as 
Lord Kitchener’s representative on the de Bunsen committee, advising on Middle East affairs, before 
joining the Arab Bureau. 
8 Ireland, 144. For more strictly historical accounts, see Sir James Aylmer Lowthorpe Haldane, The 
Insurrection in Mesopotamia, 1920 (Edinburgh, 1922).  Charles Townshend, Desert Hell: The British 
Invasion of Mesopotamia (Cambridge, 2011) 463-478.  Ali al-Wardi, Lamahat Ijtima’iyah min Tarikh al 
Iraq al Hadith (Beirut, 2005) v.6, pt.1.  
9 Jabar and Dawod, 284-285. 
 7 
Saddam even commissioned a film in 1983 starring Oliver Reed, “al-Mas’ala al-Kubra”. 
Not surprisingly, the film showed Sunni rather than Shi’a tribes playing the leading role 
in the rebellion, which was also initiated, naturally, by Saddam’s hometown of Tikrit 
(historically, it took no part in the uprising).10  One writer emphasized the distinct, 
leading role played by chieftains of his own tribe (although there is no record of the tribe 
participating in the uprising), portraying them as ‘sole heroes of the independence 
revolution’, while another cited the Baghdad elite (who remained quiet throughout the 
uprising though they had organized political rallies and speeches during the previous 
Ramadan) as ‘the thinking powerhouse’ and ‘masterminds’ of the ‘revolution’.  Other 
writers stressed the role of al-‘Ahd and the Haras al-Istiqlal parties (both of which 
contained significant numbers of Shia) which set up printing presses in Najaf and Karbala 
to distribute leaflets (without discernible effect) urging the tribes to unite and revolt, 
while still others attempted to underline the ‘patriotic exploits’ on behalf of Iraq’s 
‘independence’ conducted by the (primarily Sunni) Mosul branch of al-‘Ahd (Mosul 
remained quiet throughout the uprising).11 
Above all, the tribes were concerned with maintaining and potentially increasing 
their power and material welfare.  During the war the tribal leaders carefully weighed the 
competing merits of remaining loyal to the Ottomans or throwing in with the British and 
thought nothing of changing allegiances as the battle seemed to favor one side or the 
other.  Equally, during the uprising, ‘revolutionary’ actions were neither premeditated nor 
                                                
10 Townshend, 472. 
11 Jabar and Dawod, 284-286. Ghassan ‘Atiyah, Iraq, 1908-1921: A Socio-Political Study (Beirut, 1973) 
51-58. Al-Wardi commented that al-‘Ahd and Haras al-Istiqlal were at each other’s throats almost as soon 
as they’d been established. Al-Wardi, op. cit., v.5, 92-94. 
 8 
coordinated but rather purely local responses to specific economic or political issues as 
they occurred.  In the case of the 1920 uprising, the initial spark was provided by the 
arrest of Sha’lan Abu al-Jon, sheikh of the Dhawalim clan of the Bani Hajim tribe, who 
refused to pay taxes to the British administrator in charge of revenues collection.12  His 
tribesmen loyally stormed the police station where he was being held, killed a number of 
policemen, and set him free.  At no point during this affair or after did the sheikh exhibit 
or incite any political activism, though this failed to prevent nationalist writers from 
dismissing evidence of a parochial economic driver in favor of a grander catalyst.  
According to al-Wardi, it was Sheikh Ali al-Sharqi alone, a contemporary of many of 
those involved in the uprising, who emphasized the true local nature of the event.13 
Despite the fact that the majority of the skirmishing that ensued in the late 
summer and early fall involved tribal forces only in and around the mid-Euphrates area, 
with a scattered number of isolated incidents popping up at greater distance (and 
disappearing almost as quickly), “no episode in the history of this country has been as 
revered as the 1920 rebellion.”14  Ali al-Wardi, commenting later on the sheer number 
and variety of memoirs and accounts reflected that the writers had “done well in the arena 
of teaching nationalism to the new generations but interpretations such as these will not 
work in the field of scientific research.”15 
                                                
12 The Ottoman record of revenue collection in these frontier vilayets was sketchy at best. The authority 
later imposed by the British proved a double-edged sword.  While their administration may have been more 
efficient, it also likely marked the first time the sheikhs couldn’t evade payment. Jabar and Dawod, 292. 
‘Atiyah, 53. 
13 Al-Wardi, v.6, 233-234. 
14 Jabar and Dawod, 283.  
15 al-Wardi, v6. 334. 
 9 
The uprising finally petered out in the autumn of 1920, having cost the British 
Treasury over £40 million, almost double the £25 million incurred by the Mesopotamia 
garrison as its annual expense, along with 900 British and Indian soldiers killed, 
wounded, or missing. Tribal losses were more than five times that number.16  General 
Haldane criticized the period following the end of the war as “wildly extravagant” 
financially, though he also railed against politicians and members of the press in England 
who failed to grasp the logistics of undertaking operations in a country so lacking in 
resources necessary to sustain an army in the field.17  In London, the traditional idea that 
imperial holdings should be self-sustaining had re-emerged shortly after the Armistice 
and Winston Churchill, as Minister of War, faced significant pressures to reduce the 
garrison and its expense.  The fact that the India Secretary had finally produced a written 
statement of “our objective” in Iraq in February 1919 was of little use as its wording and 
timetable were too vague, calling for “a flexible constitution, giving full play to the 
different elements of the population, and recognizing and incorporating local peculiarities 
and distinctions” that was intended to provide for “Arab participation as time goes on in 
the actual government and administration of the country.”18 
In the end events outside Iraq shaped, to a certain degree, the measures enacted 
within the country.  The entry of the United States into the war and, following the 
Armistice, President Woodrow Wilson’s dominance of the Paris Peace Conference 
presaged inexorable changes in the practices of territorial annexation and political 
                                                
16 Haldane, 331.  
17 Ibid, 65. 
18 Townshend, 441. 
 10 
tutelage based upon outmoded notions of cultural and racial superiority.  His demands at 
the Peace Conference for “open seas, open markets and self-determination,” raised the 
possibility of a new international order that rested on the “universal unit of the sovereign 
state, fostering comparatively open world markets and independent governments.”19 
                                                
19 Toby Dodge, Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building and a History Denied (New York, 2003) 4. 
 11 
Chapter III: Constructing a Country 
 
The British army occupied Baghdad in March 1917, and by November 1918 they 
held Mosul.  Earlier fears of Russian rivalry and encroachment on British interests in Iran 
or Britain’s control of India had receded and the British could turn their attention to the 
political future of Mesopotamia.20  Most immediately, “the necessity of replacing the 
vacuum left by the departure of the Turks” rendered imperative some form of basic 
administration.21  In September 1918, the vilayets of Basra and Baghdad were combined 
under the aegis of Sir Percy Cox as Civil Commissioner, with Lt-Col. Arnold Wilson 
acting as his deputy.  Several political officers, the mainstay of British imperial 
governance, were quickly assigned to various districts, responsible for administering 
justice, maintaining law and order, settling disputes between town and tribe, collecting 
revenue, and pacifying restless tribesmen.22  In the absence of any clear communication 
between London and Baghdad, those on the ground, drawn from the ranks of the Indian 
Army and Civil Service, set about establishing and maintaining the kind of administrative 
machine with which they were familiar. 
Within a week of the occupation of Basra in 1914, a Civil Police service modeled 
on Indian lines replaced the Military Police under the supervision of an Anglo-Indian 
police officer with long experience on the North West Frontier.23  For the administration 
of civil and criminal justice within the towns and cities a penal code was developed, also 
                                                
20 Ireland, 38. 
21 Ireland, 74. 
22 Reeva S. Simon and Eleanor H. Tejirian, eds., The Creation of Iraq, 1914-1921 (New York, 2004) 24. 
23 Ireland, 81. 
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based on Indian models.  As for the tribes, the British determined that the previous 
Ottoman policy of tribal settlement had failed due to the ineffectualness of the “feeble 
Turkish tax gatherers” who brought with them the contaminating effects of modernity.  
The results were “endless bickering” amongst the tribes and “…the tendency towards 
leveling, division, and disunity.”24  Instead of utilizing the power of the sheikhs, the 
Ottomans “pursued their classic policy of attempting to improve their own position by the 
destruction of such native elements of order as were in existence.  To recognize local 
dominion and yoke it to his service was beyond the conception of the Turk,” whereas the 
British were convinced of their own innate ability to understand an appropriate delegation 
of power through local structures. 25 
In order to counteract the “still sullen and unruly tribes,” the British set about 
rebuilding a tribal organization and restoring the authority of paramount tribal sheiks, 
which had organically dissolved some time prior to the war, on the understanding that 
“both the attitudes and action of a tribe depend almost entirely on its most influential 
chiefs.”26  Of course, once the “natural importance” of the sheiks was reconstituted it was 
much easier to implement the Sandeman System, created for use among the tribes in the 
NWFP and dependent on the existence (or creation) of paramount chiefs working under 
the supervision and control of political officers, to deal with tribal disputes as and when 
                                                
24 Stephen Hemsley Longrigg, Iraq, 1900-1950: A Political, Social, and Economic History (London, 
1953), 25. 
25 Bell, Cmd. 1061, 94. 
26 Ireland, 94.  Also, see Townshend, 407-408.  The British appointed cooperative sheikhs to fill these 
roles, inflicting punishment on the other sheikhs until they agreed to recognize them. 
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they arose in Iraq.27  All this, despite Major-General Sir Stanley Maude, C-in-C of the 
British forces in Iraq, having issued a florid proclamation to the inhabitants of Baghdad 
after the army entered the city in March 1917 promising that Britain had “no wish to 
impose alien institutions on the people of Baghdad” and that they would be allowed to 
“enjoy their wealth and substance under institutions which are fully in consonance with 
their sacred laws and their racial ideals.”28  The notion of establishing an Arab 
administration to govern the Baghdad vilayet while Basra remained under ‘Indian’ 
derived control was quickly discarded.  Increasingly, however, external pressures became 
more acute and previously unchallenged assumptions of British imperial policy had to be 
reconciled to the changing political currents.29 
Imperial policy had already begun to oscillate in the first decade of the twentieth 
century as Viceroys responded to Indian nationalist agitation with various measures of 
political reform on the subcontinent.  These changes, in turn, made the continued 
application of colonial Indian methods in Iraq untenable, as it was hardly appropriate to 
saddle one territory with a system that would apparently be dismantled in another.  
Indeed, much of the confusion over implementation of a coherent policy following the 
Armistice, although deriving partly from London’s inability to present a clear line of 
action, sprang also from the difficulty of convincing civil servants, both in Baghdad and 
                                                
27 Ireland, 85. 
28 Simon and Tejirian, 23.  The proclamation, full of ‘oriental and flowery language’ was written by Sir 
Mark Sykes and Maude had no desire to make it, feeling it was it ill-timed and unduly ambitious as it 
invited self-governance when the British had already established India Office control in Basra. 
29 Peter Sluglett, Britain in Iraq: Contriving King and Country, 1914-1932 (New York, 2007) 13. 
 14 
in the India Office itself, that Indian administrative methods and machinery could no 
longer be used in whatever future scheme was devised for Iraq.30 
 President Wilson’s determination to institute a global order of states that would 
act collectively in mutually supportive ways (a sort of revised Westphalian system) 
resulted in the delivery of his fourteen points speech to Congress on 8 January 1918.  
This speech, combined with one given by Lloyd George three days earlier calling for 
Mesopotamia, along with other non-Turkish areas of the Ottoman Empire, to be 
recognized as having “their separate national conditions,” marked the beginning of 
Britain’s slow retreat from Empire.31  The impact of these speeches on the political elite 
in London were aptly recorded by Sir Mark Sykes: 
 If America had not come into the war, if the Russian revolution had not 
taken place, if the idea of no annexation had not taken root, if the world spirit of 
this time was the world spirit of 1887, there would be no reason why we should 
take any steps to consolidate our position against a peace conference, it would be 
good enough….[But now]…imperialism, annexation, military triumph, prestige, 
White man’s burdens, have been expunged from the popular political vocabulary, 
consequently Protectorates, spheres of interest or influence, annexations, bases, 
etc., have to be consigned to the Diplomatic lumber-room.32  
 
In the scramble to adapt to the changing political environment, the British, like 
the Ottomans before them, sought to understand and, consequently, to manage Iraq 
through the creation of a social base with which they were familiar, or could 
accommodate to their own interests in the region.  The Ottoman administrators had urged 
education to mold the inhabitants of the three vilayets comprising the Mesopotamian 
                                                
30 Ibid, 20-22. 
31 Ibid, 24. 
32 Dodge, 13. 
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frontier into a more cohesive, orthodox entity through the inculcation of uniform 
religious values that would also serve to propound the legitimating ideology of the state.33  
In similar vein, the British looked to the minorities, mostly Sunni, with leavenings of 
Christian and Jewish appointees, to mold an administration that would most likely fit the 
prevailing international attitudes regarding nationalism and self-determination while 
remaining susceptible to Imperial interests. 
 What we want to have in existence, what we ought to have been creating 
in this time is some administration with Arab institutions which we can safely 
leave while pulling the strings ourselves; something that won’t cost very much, 
but under which our economic and political interests will be secure.34 
 
British dependence on minorities to assist in the new administration overlooked 
the majority Shi’a inhabitants of the Basra and Baghdad vilayets while adhering neatly to 
their rigid understanding of Iraqi society and the urban-rural divide.  Colonial 
administrators persisted in believing the ‘urban-based effendi’ were ‘parasites on 
society,’ utterly lacking the virile qualities of the tribesmen who remained untouched by 
‘the emasculating effects of modernity and the city’.35  Yet it was preferable to 
incorporate educated Sunnis, Christians, and Jews into the structure of administration, as 
their minority status would render them dependent, in turn, on the British for their 
preservation. 
                                                
33 Selim Derengil, “The Struggle Against Shi’ism in Hamidian Iraq: A Study in Ottoman Counter-
Propaganda,” Die Welt des Islams 30 (1990) 61. 
34 As quoted in Sluglett, 31. Private correspondence between Sir Arthur Hirtzel (1870-1937) of the India 
Office and Lt-Col. Wilson. 
35 As quoted in Jabar and Dawod, 260. 
 16 
Little or no effort was made to incorporate mujtahids or other educated members 
of the ‘ulama in cities such as Najaf and Karbala as they were considered even worse by 
virtue of being ‘Persian’ in addition to ‘town-dwelling’.36  One British magistrate in 
Baghdad, who described the Shi‘a as a “childlike, primitive, and uneducated folk” 
remarked that the atmospheres of Najaf and Karbala were particularly depressing, as 
“money for the sake of power, and power for the sake of money actuate every moment of 
the lives of ninety per cent of the inhabitants.  The jealousy and rivalry among the 
religious leaders never cease.”37  The British persisted in regarding the Shi’a with the 
same degree of prejudice with which they accused the Shi’a themselves of generally 
harboring.  “The population south of Baghdad were an almost solid Shi‘ah bloc, nearly 
wholly illiterate…the mental horizons of the people coincided with their physical 
horizons.”38 
 Despite her exhaustive catalogue of tribal genealogy, Gertrude Bell also persisted 
in treating the population south of Baghdad as full of “Shiah obscurantists” and described 
Najaf as “mysterious, malign, (and) fanatical.”39  When Wilson was instructed by the 
British Government to poll the population on whether they were in favor of a single Arab 
                                                
36 Longrigg, 10. 
37 Thomas Lyell, The Ins and Outs of Mesopotamia (London, 1923) 75 and 43. 
38 Ibid, 68. 
39 Gertrude Margaret Lowthian Bell (1868-1926) In her role as political officer, Bell exerted a great deal of 
influence with the British in London and in the Arab Bureau.  Yet for all the qualities attributed to her by 
many of her contemporaries and later biographers, her influence over Faisal was considerably less than is 
popularly accepted.  Faisal’s refusal to remain fixed in the cutout role of noble-yet-malleable Arab king to 
which Bell’s imagination had consigned him proved a steady source of frustration to her.  For his part, once 
he ascended the throne Faisal sought out Bell primarily for the occasional afternoon tea in her garden. 
When asked after her death about the accuracy of many of her reminiscences, Faisal is said to have replied 
simply, ‘Miss Bell was true in what she wrote but did great harm in what she did, may God rest her soul.’ 
As quoted in Allawi, 375.  Also, Lady Bell, ed. The Letters of Gertrude Bell (London, 1927) v. I, 473. 
 17 
State with an Arab Amir under British tutelage, Bell recorded that “it was clearly 
impracticable to pursue the enquiry among the rank and file of the tribesmen, shepherds, 
marsh dwellers, rice, barley, and date cultivators of the Euphrates and Tigris, whose 
experience of statecraft was confined to speculations as to the performances of their next 
door neighbours.”40  Continued emphasis was placed on the differences and lack of 
understanding between urban and rural classes of the population, which belied the 
frequent socioeconomic and cultural interactions among them.  British notions of the 
‘martial races’ in India and the ‘noble Bedouin’ in Africa and Arabia remained fixed on 
the putative virile qualities of hill dwellers and tribesmen, as opposed to town dwellers 
who had succumbed to the temptations of modernism, despite the fact that in Iraq ‘many 
townsmen were of relatively recent tribal origin.’41 
The mujtahids themselves were frequently dismissed as though they were little 
more than a small, entrenched clique that had no real interactions or support base that 
extended beyond the confines of the shrine cities, other than to “loose and bind” the 
tribesmen with fatwahs and calls for Jihad.  “The Shia’ in particular, and Islam in general, 
are cut off from the world.  They have built themselves in with impassable walls of 
prejudice and bigotry.”42   So prevalent was the theme of Shi‘a backwardness that a 
special correspondent, sent to Baghdad by the Daily Mail newspaper in 1922 to study the 
proposed cost to the taxpayer of Britain’s continuing support for the new monarchy, felt 
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compelled to comment that “more than half the population of Mesopotamia are fanatical 
Shahs (sic) who are opposed to all forms of civil power.”43 
 According to Antonio Gramsci, hegemony may be understood as the attempt by 
political elites to generalize their interests to the populace at large.44  Hegemony not only 
seeks to incorporate all the component elements within a society, but also encourages the 
generation of foundational myths (such as the 1920 revolution) that define and legitimize 
a particularist national identity.  Thus, hegemony involves acceptance of a specific 
political community and state-linked outlook that sustains a moral, philosophical and 
ethical system and also provides “intellectual and moral leadership.”45  Ottoman efforts to 
achieve a concrete hegemony over the three outlying provinces of Mesopotamia had 
consistently failed over the centuries, not least because the provinces constituted a 
disparate and frequently contested march territory between two opposing empires, a 
cultural-religious contact zone between Sunni and Shi’a powers and their rival claims to 
the sovereignty of Islam.  The Ottomans sought to extend their control beyond 
Mesopotamia directly into the Persian heartland whereas the Persians, in particular the 
Qajars, viewed the Euphrates as the rightful boundary of their realm, albeit both empires 
considered the disputed region “inhospitable and difficult to defend.”46  Left to itself, 
Mosul would likely have been subsumed under Syria following the First World War.47  
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Instead it went to the British, who took the entire province after the Armistice in a bid to 
offset the large Shi’a population in the two southern provinces and in hopes of obtaining 
a future oil concession. 
The three provinces that ultimately comprised Iraq were incorporated into the 
Ottoman Empire during the latter half of the seventeenth century but control by Istanbul 
proved tenuous.  Various factors contributed to this condition, including the physical 
distance of the provinces from the seat of Imperial administration and the rapacious 
attitude of the mamluk pashas, who were more concerned with extracting revenues and 
defending their personal privileges than serving the interests of the central government.48  
Despite geographic proximity, trade connections, and travel, on a regional scale Mosul 
tended to identify with Aleppo and Anatolian interests, Baghdad, with Beirut and 
Damascus (though it was also a centre of the Persian transit trade), while Basra had long 
established trading connections with India and the Persian Gulf.49  Whether as a result of 
distance or absorption in pecuniary interests, the Ottomans failed to notice until late in 
the nineteenth century the degree to which the inhabitants of the southern region had 
developed a culturally (and politically) cohesive religious identity distinct from the 
Imperial mainstream. 
The transformation of southern Iraq into a Shi’a preserve was not only the result 
of gradual tribal settlement.  Ibn Sa‘ud’s conquest of Hasa in 1795 allowed him to expand 
his influence beyond the territory surrounding Najd.  Wahhabi raids pushed some tribes 
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into Iraq and the Ottomans encouraged them to settle in the hopes they would form a 
confederation strong enough to then defeat the Wahhabis, who were growing mettlesome.  
Though the tribes settled, they were unable to prevent raids against the desert market 
towns of Najaf and Karbala and the surrounding countryside.  Najaf suffered two sieges 
and Karbala was rather brutally sacked in 1801.  For the Shi‘a ‘ulama in the southern 
provinces, these invasions served as a catalyst.  Beyond the immediate danger 
represented by the force of the Wahhabis, the power of the nomadic tribes, in general, 
was considered a threat to their livelihood and income.  In 1814, emboldened by the weak 
Mamluk control south of Baghdad, a number of these tribes rebelled against the 
government.  This action coincided with one of the major annual pilgrimages to the 
shrine cities and some 40,000 pilgrims were marooned in Najaf and Karbala pending the 
suppression of the tribes.50   
Raids, rebellions, and political instability alarmed those ‘ulama who had migrated 
from Persia in the middle of the eighteenth century.  They considered the only means to 
securing their socioeconomic safety was to convert the tribes and establish as large a 
network of unified support as possible throughout the southern vilayets in hopes of 
creating a force powerful enough to withstand external political and religious pressures, 
whether from the Wahhabis or from Baghdad itself.  Religious traffic, in the form of 
pilgrimage, corpse traffic from Persia, and charitable contributions, provided the 
economic mainstay of the shrine cities.  In general, certain religious conventions sat 
rather lightly on the shoulders of the nomadic tribes, especially those that ranged further 
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afield from the cities.  They neither visited them on pilgrimage nor exhibited any 
particular attachment to their sanctity.51  Likely, the ‘ulama were aware of this and in the 
conversion of the tribes, saw not only the chance of a more permanent safety for 
themselves and the cities but also the opportunity to increase the potential income that 
would flow into those cities through previously untapped local contributors.   
Interestingly, despite the undoubted fervor of the ‘ulama, Shi‘a propagation only 
proved truly effective following the enlargement of the areas under cultivation around 
Najaf and Karbala, which resulted from the operation of the Hindiyya canal and the 
increased sedentarization of the tribes.52  The construction of three smaller canals late in 
the nineteenth century further improved the flow of water to Najaf and increased the 
fertile area between Najaf and Karbala, attracting more settlement and confirming the 
position of those two cities as the “nerve centers” of an increasingly vast territory.53     
By the last decade of the nineteenth century, officials noted with alarm the large 
numbers of converts to Shi’a Islam in the region.  They considered the root of the 
problem lay not only in a lack of Sunni ‘ulama to keep pace with proselytizing ‘ulama 
from Iran and the shrine cities but also “in the ignorance of the local population of 
nomads and Bedouins, who too easily fell under the influence of the Iranian ‘ulama.”54 
In a report on the situation sent by an Ottoman consul to Istanbul, the consul suggested 
that, as over forty percent of the Iraq population was now Shi’a (the actual figure was 
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higher), it would be impossible to use force to sway such numbers.  Therefore, the only 
feasible ‘cure’ was education that would instill the virtues of Sunni Islam in primary 
schools combined with “the appointment of official ‘ulama to counter Shi’a propaganda 
by inculcating Sunnism and obedience to the Caliph.”55  In fact, a number of suggestions 
were forwarded by Ottoman officials over the next few years, all stressing education and 
the imposition of religious uniformity and orthodoxy as a means of countering the 
insidious spread of Shi’ism and effectively incorporating the recalcitrant population 
within the Ottoman fold. 
 The spread of education will instill the love of religion (din), country 
(vatan), and nationality (milliyet), as well as strengthening the salutary allegiance 
of the people to our Master the Caliph of all Muslims.  While the persistence of 
ignorance will only increase and intensify disunity and disintegration.56 
 
This emphasis on ‘proper’ education and the ‘ignorance’ of tribesmen and others 
who converted to Shi‘ism were recurring themes with the Ottomans just as they were 
later with the British.  Mujtahids were active among the ranks both of the police force as 
well as the Ottoman Sixth Army, which faced the British Expeditionary Force during the 
war, and many members of these units had converted to Shi‘ism rendering them 
unreliable in the eyes of the Ottoman government.  The mujtahids worked  “to further the 
darkest ignorance of the population in order to rob and milk them as is their custom, 
because (they know) that for the population to be enlightened means that they will obey 
no other than their rightful ruler…”57  Similar sentiments dismissing the Shi‘a as ignorant 
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and the mujtahids as disingenuous would color a majority of opinions among the British 
military and administrative officials in Iraq during and after the First World War, as well 
as the small coterie of Sunni ex-Sharifian officers subsequently responsible for ensuring 
the development of the country. 
Ultimately the Ottomans failed to curtail or counteract the conversion rates to 
Shi’ism in Iraq because they had neither the inclination nor the ability to match the 
financial support received by the mujtahids from a combination of Persian and foreign 
contributions as well as the incomes derived from the traffic to the shrine cities of Najaf 
and Karbala.  The sheer magnitude and speed of the conversion process were 
underestimated, as were the implications of the transition by the tribes from their 
traditional nomadism to the practice of sedentary agriculture which the Ottomans had 
long encouraged.  The fragmentation of the greater tribal confederations generated an 
identity crisis among those tribesmen who settled, driving them to “relocate themselves 
on the social map of their surrounding environment.”58  Conversion compensated for the 
fracturing of former political and group solidarities, creating new identities and loyalties 
as the tribesmen came in increasing contact with other settled inhabitants of the region 
around them and, notably, with the cities of Najaf and Karbala.   
Yet despite the ease with which Shi’ism was accepted among the tribes, it failed 
to supplant the primordial Arab moral and social values. The role of genealogy, for 
instance, became even more important to the establishment of an individual’s identity 
following the erosion of previous tribal cohesiveness (which would later act somewhat in 
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Faisal’s favor as a Hashemite even though he was neither Iraqi nor Shi’i).59  The Shi‘a 
emissaries incorporated familiar tribal ideals of manhood, heroic deeds, celebration, 
horsemanship, and epic oral poetry into their Islamic teachings to facilitate conversion, 
which became a process of acculturation for the tribesmen as the new rituals of worship 
helped define and enrich their new identities.  Continued interactions among these newly 
sedentary groups with their (still Sunni) nomadic brethren reinforced their Arab heritage 
and identity and, despite the proximity to Iran, a distinct Arab Shi‘a polity began to 
emerge in southern Iraq that only intensified with events leading up to the outbreak of the 
First World War. 
The Young Turk Revolution of 1908 and the restoration of the Turkish 
Constitution marked the beginnings of Shi‘a secular education in Iraq.  The first public 
primary school for boys was opened in Baghdad in 1909, followed by schools in 
Kazimayn, Najaf, and Hilla.  The modern curriculum was designed to train the students 
in French, English, and mathematics in order to enable them to compete for governmental 
administrative positions that had always been filled by educated Jews and, to a lesser 
extent, Sunni Muslims.60  The 1908 Revolution also stimulated the literary life of Iraq.  
Publishing houses for magazines and books appeared in Najaf and, by 1911, “it was 
estimated that fifty to one hundred newspapers and journals arrived in Najaf every week” 
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for distribution to the city’s libraries, and the inhabitants both in Najaf and Karbala were 
introduced to the product of literary efforts from Turkey, India, Egypt, and Iran.61   
The content of these publications was varied but among the topics presented were 
debates regarding the consistency of Islamic law with modern science and education, 
calls for Islamic renewal and purification from extremism, the defense of Islam as 
addressed by the Islamic reformist thought of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad 
‘Abduh, and Muhammad Rashid Rida, and the need for integration and unity among 
Muslims.62  Newspapers such as al-Manar (produced by Rashid Rida) were particularly 
influential among Iraqis.  Rashid Rida glorified historic Arab achievements, 
simultaneously exposing Ottoman deficiencies and the despotism of Ottoman rule.  By 
the same token, he called for a preservation of the Empire in the face of Western 
incursions and condemned both Arab nationalists in Egypt and Turkish nationalists for 
endangering Islamic unity and, in this, he was not alone among Muslim intellectuals and 
proponents of an Arab nationalism.63  This dichotomy between Arabism and Islamism (as 
represented by the Ottoman Empire) may, in part, have explained the failure of any 
coherent call to unified political action on the part of Arab intellectuals when the First 
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World War was declared in 1914.64  It may also explain why the Arab Revolt had so little 
resonance in Iraq, save among those few Iraqi officers who actually took part.65 
The British, like the Ottomans before them, also underestimated or overlooked the 
significant Shi’a nationalist identity emerging in the South.  They would insist that Basra, 
whose prominence as a trading entrepôt had been steadily increasing, surrender its 
traditional autonomy in favor of establishing a minority nationalist project centered on 
Baghdad under the auspices of a pliable monarch and a primarily non-local sectarian 
government.  One possibility for this refusal to recognize developments in the southern 
region was that a conscious acknowledgement would have belied any justification by the 
British for acquiring the northern province of Mosul.  Indeed, following the British troops 
entry into Baghdad, Lt-Col. Wilson disparaged the attempt of Shi’a leaders from the 
shrine cities to “establish their position as the heads of a theocratic imperium in imperio 
by exchanging telegrams of congratulations with King George,” while Sir Percy Cox 
treated their subsequent visit to Baghdad to pay their respects as a notice of formal 
submission to British authority.66  Another possibility is that the emergent language of 
national identity following the First World War dealt in vocabulary that registered secular 
nationalism rather than a theocratic-based nationalism.  If the British didn’t exactly fear a 
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theocratic identity, they certainly considered it out of place in the establishment of a 
modern state system.   
Not only did the two southern provinces contain a majority of Shi‘a, but the task 
of defending Baghdad (one of the arguments for advancing to Mosul) required little more 
than a 50 mile advance up the two rivers.67  In fact, British forces took Mosul (some 200+ 
miles from Baghdad) three days after the Armistice of Mudros that ended the war on 31 
October 1918.  General Marshall, the British commander tasked with occupying the city, 
was politely informed by Ali Ihsan Bey, the commander of the Ottoman 5th Division 
sitting in Mosul, that Mosul was not in Mesopotamia and therefore did not need to be 
surrendered according to the terms of the armistice.68  Additionally, the Sykes-Picot 
agreement placed the city in the French sphere and the political officers, at least, were 
aware the vilayet was primarily Kurdish.  Nevertheless Marshall advanced and Ali Ihsan 
withdrew, leaving Mosul a de facto addition to the British sphere.  France was left to 
negotiate the final boundary lines with the British in a separate convention, after 
Mesopotamia and Syria were established as mandates during the San Remo conference in 
April 1920. 
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Chapter IV: ‘What is wanted is a king who will be content to reign but not govern’69 
 
Although the 1920 uprising might be more significant for purposes of Nationalist 
historiography than as an actual historical event, it did serve to convince Whitehall that 
turning Iraq into a protectorate ruled directly by Britain was no longer feasible in terms 
either of expenditure or commitment of manpower.  The international political climate 
was also no longer amenable to direct rule and it was determined that power would have 
to be exercised indirectly; through influence, allusion, and the oversight of a British high 
commissioner. 
Wilson was removed and Cox, who had left for Tehran to negotiate the Anglo-
Persian Treaty of 1919, returned to Baghdad and his previous post as civil commissioner, 
with a remit to supervise construction of an Arab government.  In the face of continued 
criticism in the press and parliament regarding the cost to the taxpayer, there was still 
considerable doubt at this stage whether Britain would even remain in Mesopotamia.  As 
neither the Foreign Office nor the India Office were really structured to manage the 
newly mandated territories, Lloyd George and his cabinet responded by creating a new 
department for Middle Eastern policy within the Colonial Office.  Churchill, who had 
made the establishment of the new department a condition of his acceptance of the post 
of Colonial Secretary, immediately organized the Cairo Conference in March 1921 to 
discuss the future of the mandated territories.   
The main object, in Churchill’s estimation, was “to maintain firm British control 
as cheaply as possible.” 70  For Mesopotamia this meant the implementation of air power, 
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in the form of eight squadrons of aircraft matched with six armored car companies, to 
provide essential security from a few strategically located bases.  Tribal uprisings, the 
largest source of instability, could be subdued with aerial bombings and the R.A.F. could 
effectively maintain the lines of communication and supply without the need for large 
numbers of ground troops.  Britain was to control the country’s foreign relations and 
maintain the right of veto in all military and financial matters.  All that remained was to 
determine the ruler most likely to support British policy.   
Churchill had already met with Faisal in London and favored him for the throne, 
following Lawrence’s advice on the matter despite increasing concern shown in some 
quarters that Lawrence was neither stable nor fit for an administrative post.71  For his 
part, Lawrence argued that Faisal would have to ‘counteract the claims of rival 
candidates, and pull together the scattered elements of a backward and half civilized 
country’, a feat that required an ‘active and inspiring personality’ as opposed to his 
brother Abdallah, also in contention for the position, whom Lawrence dismissed as ‘lazy 
and by no means dominating’.72  Cox, though initially agnostic about Faisal (as well as 
Abdallah), felt that at least Faisal’s military experience would put him ‘in the best 
position for raising an army quickly’.73   
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Churchill remained adamant that the overriding concern was economy.  British 
troops were ‘extremely costly’ and should not be wasted on ‘menial duties’.74  Arab 
levies were required and Faisal, in effect, was to be hired to raise them for the Empire.  
On the first day of the conference a range of possible candidates was discussed, from the 
Naqib of Baghdad to ibn Saud to the Agha Khan.  For the local candidates, the Naqib of 
Baghdad was deemed too old, while Sheikh Kaza’al of Mohammerah (a long-time ally of 
Britain’s interests in the Gulf) was Shi’i and thus advised by Cox that he would not even 
be considered.  Sayyid Talib, Naqib of Basra and erstwhile minister of interior in the 
interim government, whose unsavory reputation and secessionist tendencies rendered him 
dangerous in British eyes, was also the strongest contender.  Not surprisingly, he was 
expediently arrested while returning from a tea party at Lady Cox’s residence and 
deported to Ceylon.75  By comparison, Faisal seemed the most moderate and it was 
determined that if he ‘was favored by the people of Irak, His Majesty’s Government 
would offer no obstacles to his selection’.76  The arrest of Sayyid Talib proved influential 
and a moderately pro-Faisal party emerged due, in no small part, to the active efforts of 
political officers canvassing on his behalf.   
Faisal arrived in Basra on 23 June 1921 uncertain of his reception by a population 
with which he’d had little prior contact.  It was none too soon as only the week before a 
petition carrying 4,500 signatures was presented to Cox by a Basra delegation.  
Consisting primarily of merchants and landowners, the delegation demanded wide 
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autonomy, if not outright independence, for the entire province based on loyalty and firm 
ties to the British.  Basra’s port city had done very well during the war and sought to 
maintain the prosperity that the merchants equated directly with distance from Baghdad.77 
Descriptions of Faisal’s arrival, reception, and journey north via special train range from 
lackluster and wary, particularly in the southern part of the country and the shrine cities, 
to enthusiastic the closer he drew to Baghdad.  Whatever misgivings Faisal may have had 
about his reception among the Shi’a, there was no doubt that he benefited from his 
lineage and reputation for sectarian tolerance. On 11 July the interim Iraqi cabinet 
convened and unanimously passed a resolution to nominate Faisal King of Iraq.  He 
worked assiduously to build relationships (and support) within the minority communities 
and among the Shi’a, travelling throughout the towns and countryside in south and 
central Iraq in the weeks prior to the referendum that would establish his legitimate claim 
to the throne.   
The referendum returned a 96% majority in favor of Faisal, but it is virtually 
impossible to determine with any real accuracy the degree of acceptance, especially as 
the British stage-managed both his selection and election.78  Cox exercised considerable 
authority in Iraq and many among the political and social elites were in awe of 
‘Kawkus’s’ pro-consular presence and of British power, and Cox had already seen to it 
that there was no real alternative to Faisal’s election.  ‘What helps everything is that 
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Faisal’s personality goes three quarters of the way,’ wrote Bell.79  Gifted with impeccable 
manners and a careful diplomacy, Faisal was maneuvered to the throne on 23 August 
1921.  It seemed the British had achieved a masterstroke but Faisal’s support base was 
relatively shallow, albeit broad, and he had his own ideas regarding the monarchy. 
The word the British first used to describe the mandate was ةﺓيﻱاﺍصﺹوﻭ  but this was 
considered too demeaning so the word بﺏاﺍدﺩتﺕنﻥاﺍ  was adopted instead, implying choice or 
selection.80  By mid-1921, Cox was aware that the mandate in its original form was 
unlikely to prove acceptable or effective and suggested negotiating a treaty with Iraq 
once the state was formally created.81  However the Foreign Office worried that the 
French would see any British move to set aside or supersede the mandate as a deliberate 
attempt to undermine their position as mandatary in Syria.  This led the British 
representative to the League of Nations to stress, at the end of 1921, that the proposed 
treaty was ‘not intended as a substitute for the mandate, which will remain the operative 
document’ defining relations between Britain and Iraq.82  News of the announcement 
incensed Faisal, who needed the treaty not only to bolster his position within Iraq but to 
show that he was actively taking steps to draw from the British the powers they attributed 
to themselves as controllers of Iraq.  Though aware that he owed his election to British 
manipulation, Faisal felt that substitution of a treaty for the mandate constituted a change 
in relationship, rather than simply a change in vocabulary, and he expected to govern.  He 
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didn’t share the political vision of his father or brother, for whom Arab nationalism was 
molded within traditional Islamic forms of the state.  Faisal had a more secular approach. 
He understood that the collapse of the Ottoman Empire shifted the foundations of rule in 
Arab lands away from the narrow dynastic principle and purely traditional and religious 
formulations, and his own inclinations tended toward a more moderate and pragmatic 
nationalism.83   
Faisal very nearly refused the throne because Churchill wanted public 
confirmation that he accepted the mandate and considered his position subordinate to that 
of the civil commissioner.  Faisal pointed out that no king could earn the respect of his 
people if he started by declaring his dependence on his allies.  ‘Having chosen me you 
must treat me as one of yourselves and if you wish me and your policy to succeed it is 
folly to damn me permanently in the public eye by making me an obvious puppet.’84  
Fortunately for Faisal, Cox was supportive and prevailed upon Churchill to withdraw his 
stipulation, allowing the coronation to proceed.  At 38 years of age, Faisal became king 
of a newly created country that was still not quite a nation. 
The political system proposed for Iraq was based on secular western models of 
representative government, popular elections, a parliament, and a constitution.  Unlike 
Iran, which had managed its own political transition during the 1905-1911 Constitutional 
Revolution, Iraq’s transition was being imposed upon it by a series of external factors.  
Its boundaries had been arbitrarily determined and its borders remained unsettled.  
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Outraged by the harsh terms of the Treaty of Sèvres, Turkey was no longer moribund and 
became, once again, a viable force able and willing to fight for territory, and it wanted 
Mosul.  Ibn Saud, who destroyed Hussein’s kingdom in the Hejaz, felt his borders should 
extend to the banks of the Euphrates and allowed raiding parties of the Ikhwan to attack 
Shi’a tribesmen in central Iraq.85  Eastward, disputes over demarcation of the frontier, 
particularly along the Shatt al-Arab waterway, and Iran’s refusal to recognize the 
sovereignty of Iraq until eight years following Faisal’s coronation proved a constant 
concern.  The French objected strenuously to British support of Faisal for the throne of 
Iraq and accused Great Britain of conspiring with Faisal against France.  In 1922, the 
mandate authorities in Syria instigated a vicious newspaper campaign against Faisal, and 
were actively supplying arms to Iran in the hopes of instigating border attacks.86   
Faisal, already uneasy following the announcement at the League of Nations, 
became convinced that the military threats from Turkey and Najd were “part of an Allied 
master-plan to terrify him into submission,” the more so after the signing of the Ankara 
Agreement between France and Turkey in 1921, which he considered a blatant invitation 
to Turkey to attack northern Kurdistan.87  Despite Cox suggesting to the Colonial Office 
that it might secure greater goodwill from the Iraqis if they gave them what they wanted 
as far as the language of the mandate was concerned, Churchill held that Faisal was 
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‘rather too prone to raise difficult constitutional and foreign questions’ and should never 
be allowed to forget the ‘enormous cost and burden Iraq has been and still is to us.’88   
For his part, Faisal was even more determined to raise an army suitable for 
defense of the new country.  A strong national army meant greater independence from 
British control as well as greater internal security and support for his position.  Neither 
Faisal nor the majority of his sharifian officers could claim roots amongst the tribal, 
mercantile, or religious families of Iraq.  As such, his power base was simply too narrow, 
drawn as it was either from proximity to the Palace or to the British Residency.  By 
reason of its newness, non-Iraqi origin, and its condition of dependence on the British, 
Faisal’s monarchy inspired neither awe nor affection.  Indeed, throughout the twenties 
and thirties, the monarch and the tribal sheikhs were essentially rivals.89  The growth of 
Faisal’s power would necessitate the weakening of the sheikhs and Faisal’s position 
could only be strengthened by control over the machinery of government and the 
military.  Yet most of the British officials opposed increasing the army or its functions, 
partly because they felt it would give too much power to the ‘court party’, and partly 
because the government’s revenues were too small to permit an expansion.90 
As Faisal’s minister of defence, Ja’far al-‘Askari drew up a report arguing in 
favor of an army of 15,000 (on the basis of the former Ottoman military establishment in 
Mesopotamia). 91  Al-Askari, Yasin al-Hashimi, Nuri al-Said, and Bakr Sidqi all adhered 
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to the idea of a ‘nation in arms’, which flourished in Europe following the French 
Revolution.  The army was one of the twin engines of the modern state – the other being 
education.  Al-Askari insisted on the need for a ‘good class of recruit who has a certain 
stake in the country and may be relied upon not to desert.’92  He believed this could be 
managed by ballot rather than conscription and British military experts endorsed this 
total, noting that the Ottomans, who ‘never wasted troops’, had maintained a regular 
garrison of nearly 10,000 before the war, ‘even at their low establishments’.93  Cox flatly 
refused to countenance the proposal, arguing it was too expensive. ‘Defence can be 
purchased at too dear a price, and it would be better for Iraq to be inadequately 
garrisoned than to fall into bankruptcy’.94   
Having established the cheapest possible internal-security system by the summer 
of 1920 (R.A.F. supported by Assyrian Christian levies with strong ties to the British and 
considered a better prospect than raising and training Iraqi levies), Britain was 
determined to maintain this line, transforming the levies into the nucleus of a new Army 
that would consist of only 4,500 men.95  Al-Askari was appalled but the Chief of the Air 
Staff, Hugh Trenchard, felt they could even ‘let the Arab Army remain purely as 
eyewash’ and rely solely on the levies.96  This was politically impossible but the army’s 
development remained little more than a bargaining tool until the end of the mandate.  
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The idea was to allow the king to be militarily stronger than any single tribal sheikh but 
weaker than some or all of the tribal sheikhs together.97  Thus the question of 
conscription continued unresolved, though it was raised twice in debates in 1924 and 
1926.  Britain remained steadfastly opposed to the idea on the grounds that it was ‘against 
all our traditions’, and because it would provoke memories of ‘the arbitrary and brutal’ 
Ottoman system.98 
Faisal was gravely concerned with the imbalance of force between his minority 
Sunni government and the population.  He complained that ‘there are more than 100,000 
rifles in private hands, whereas the government has only 15,000’.99  He believed the army 
should possess the capability of facing “two simultaneous insurgencies in the country.”100  
This was an interesting variant (one made, arguably, with greater merit) to the more 
traditional justification for military spending, of being able ‘to fight a war on two fronts’.  
Once proved capable in this regard, Faisal proposed a general conscription to build the 
army’s strength to meet foreign challenges.  He also recognized the need to leaven the 
overwhelming Sunni component of the officer class that the British were slowly training 
with sons of Shi’a tribal leaders.  Of the 61 field officers that the Iraq Royal Military 
College, modeled on Sandhurst, had turned out by 1936, 58 were Sunni, 2 were Christian, 
and just 1 was Shi’i.101  Following the Ottoman pattern of creating special schools for the 
sons of tribal leaders, Faisal sought to found a school in Iraq that would prepare them for 
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entry into the military academy but abandoned the idea in the face of opposition from 
Sati’ al-Husri, Director-General for Education, who favored a completely uniform and 
centralized education policy for the country.102 
Internally, a number of problems continued to militate against political cohesion.  
The formative experience of Iraqis was Ottoman administration, autocratic and distant.  
Local authority rested more on traditional patterns of duties or obligations to tribal 
sheikhs, landowners, notables, and religious figures.  Although much of the old order had 
crumbled or been misappropriated by the British, deep rituals of obligation still governed 
a large portion of the population.  Faisal had to create the framework of a modern state 
while operating under the handicaps of being neither Iraqi nor Shi’i and with the shadow 
of the British always looming.  He could not afford to do away entirely with the old order 
(like Attaturk) and needed the legitimacy of his Sharifian lineage to navigate among the 
traditional groups and communities in the country.  In this he was not initially successful.    
As king, his first task was the appointment of a new prime minister and cabinet.  
Following three weeks of conflict with Cox (as neither would approve the other’s 
appointments) Faisal finally agreed to keep the interim prime minister originally selected 
by Cox, Naqib Abd al-Rahman al-Kaylani, and filled the other posts with those men 
who’d accompanied him from the Hejaz to Syria and then to Iraq. Apart from Ja’far al-
Askari, who maintained his position as defense minister, there were few among Faisal’s 
coterie of Ottoman officers and functionaries who were Iraqi and almost none who were 
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Shi’a.103  In addition to filling posts with men less supportive of the British, Faisal also 
sought to strengthen his support among the Shi’a by including them in the government 
but ultimately only one was chosen.  Hibbat-ullah al-Sharistani from Karbala became 
minister of education, establishing a pattern of holding that portfolio for a Shi’i minister 
that would continue throughout the 1920s in a token effort to provide some semblance of 
confessional representation in the government, a representation that was ultimately 
unsuccessful as Sati’ al-Husri controlled the state educational curriculum with an iron 
hand.104     
Faisal’s determination to increase the presence of the Shi’a in his administration 
was part of his desire to make his state system the primary agency for social and 
economic mobility in the country.  In this, he was undermined both by the general lack of 
qualifications among the Shi’a and by the prejudice of most of the officers and 
functionaries surrounding him, who held to the old Ottoman (and British) prejudices that 
the “groups composing the Iraqi population were ignorant and irrational” and thus ill-
equipped to participate in a constitutional government.105  At Rustum Haidar’s urging, 
Faisal requested that Tawfiq al-Suwaydi, the head of the Baghdad Law College since 
November 1921 (it seems to have been the sole preserve of the al-Suwaydi family), 
accept a number of students into the Law College who held certificates from the 
Ja’fariyya high school.  Al-Suwaydi stated he knew that “the school did not reach the 
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(level of) high school either in the era of the Ottomans or in the British Occupation” and 
he refused to accept them unless they had “their certificates approved by the Ministry of 
Education or they sat for the entrance exam.”106   He then received a visit from Haidar 
who informed him “the king wanted to help these (students) and admit them into the 
College.” 107  Al-Suwaydi explained why he refused and, when Haidar insisted, he 
responded that this might have been a practice during the time of Sultan Abd al-Hamid 
but such behavior ceased following the Young Turk Revolution of 1908.108   
Al-Suwaydi later learned that al-Husri, as Director-General of Education, was 
subsequently approached and asked to treat the certificates as high school certificates and 
also refused, only to learn he had no choice in the matter – a rare instance of his will 
being overridden.  The certificates were approved and al-Suwaydi had to accept them.109  
While this anecdote illustrates the difficulty Faisal faced in finding qualified Shi’a to join 
the government, it also illustrates a disturbing attitude on the part of the Ottoman 
educated elite as al-Suwaydi proceeded to list in his memoirs the full names of all the 
students he was required to admit under these special circumstances.110  Al-Husri, who 
never set foot in Iraq before 1921, remained intolerant of all his Shi’a ministers and 
criticized their performances as “ignorant and backward.”111  He maligned one of the 
country’s leading literary figures as “incapable of understanding the new directions in 
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education” that he was imposing on the country’s curriculum and dismissed one of the 
Ministers of Education (‘Abd al-Husayn al-Chalabi, who served in this capacity eight 
times between 1922 and 1935) as the “joker of Iraqi governments.”112 
The only outlet for secular education in Iraq that was exclusively Shi’a was, in 
fact, the Madrasa al-Ja’fariyya (the same as featured above), which opened in Baghdad 
in 1908.  But only a small number of students had received an education there by 1921.  
The mujtahids, as part of their opposition to the British and also to Faisal, issued a ban on 
Shi’a accepting office in a government they considered illegitimate.  Any who ignored 
this ban risked excommunication, but Faisal managed to find a common cause in their 
enmity towards the Ikhwan of Ibn Saud.113  Cox’s hesitancy in sending the RAF after the 
raiders who attacked the villages in central Iraq in March 1922 was seen both as targeting 
the mujtahids and as part of a deliberate plan to keep Iraq weak and off-balance, thus 
affirming the need for the mandate.  After all, it was common knowledge that the British 
favoured the Nejdi ruler over the Hashemites in Arabia so the raid could never have 
occurred without British acquiescence.114  The leading mujtahids of Najaf, Grand 
Ayatollahs Abul Hassan al-Isfahani and Mirza Hussein al-Na’ini, decided to convene a 
conference in Karbala to consider the response to this latest incursion.  Ayatollah Mahdi 
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al-Khalisi was also called on to attend and set out with over 20,000 followers from 
Khadimain.115 
In all, over 200,000 people descended on Karbala for the conference.  The 
Ayatollahs extended an invitation to Faisal but the Residency (i.e. Cox) placed 
considerable pressure on him not to attend and he sent Tawfiq al-Khalidi, his minister of 
interior, and Nuri al-Sa’id in his stead.  Cox called the conference ‘ill-advised and 
dangerous’ and believed that Bolsheviks and Kemalists were secretly behind it, in some 
form of collusion with Faisal.116  The mujtahids issued a fatwa authorizing a war against 
the Ikhwan and, by association, Ibn Saud, and also circulated a petition declaring their 
support of Faisal and ‘our King’s army’, tacitly encouraging him to continue in his 
demands for strengthening Iraq’s native defense capabilities.117  British intelligence noted 
at this time that a secret unit was formed to assassinate pro-British sheikhs and British 
officers.118  While the conference was underway, a deputation of more than forty tribal 
sheikhs called on Faisal at the palace to remind him that their oath of loyalty to him ‘was 
conditional upon Faisal accepting the advice of the Residency.’119  
In fact, the conference underscored the degree to which Faisal was forced to steer 
between several internal interests: the anti-mandate, Shi’a mujtahids concerned that Iraq 
was going to become another Sunni-dominated establishment, the pro-British tribesmen 
concerned for loss of power and status under an Iraq without the British, the determinedly 
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secular Arab nationalism of his government, and Faisal’s own realization that he was ill-
equipped to embark on independence without the continued support of British finances 
and power.  Faisal admitted to Cox that he had ‘underestimated the extent and range of 
moderate opinion’ and that he should be counted ‘amongst those who were firm 
proponents of the British role in Iraq.’120  On hearing the news of the conference and 
Faisal’s likely behind-the-scenes maneuvering, Churchill reiterated that ‘all the time he 
(Faisal) takes our money, he will have to take our directions’ concluding that Britain 
could still abandon the king. ‘Faisal should be under no delusions in this matter.  He will 
be a long time looking for a third throne.’121 
The one-year anniversary of Faisal’s coronation was drawing close while Britain 
and Iraq had yet to sign the treaty that would define the precise nature of their 
relationship.  The British understanding of the treaty was simply as a camouflage for 
mandate, whereas Faisal’s refusal to publicly acknowledge his submission to Cox was 
indicative of his desire to see the treaty as a mark of mutual respect and assistance 
between two sovereign nations; a clear signpost pointing to Iraq’s independence in a not-
too-distant future.  Negotiations between the Residency and the Palace stalemated as 
Faisal continued his efforts to drum up opposition to the draft treaty which, in its initial 
form, did little more than lay out Britain’s pre-eminence in Iraq in nearly all fields of 
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state and government, including a special article inserted that would obligate the king to 
be guided in all decisions by the high commissioner.122   
Matters came to a head when Churchill issued a statement to the House of 
Commons claiming that Faisal and his government had ‘never informed Britain that the 
Iraqi people rejected the idea of a mandate.’123  The Baghdad press reported this 
statement and the uproar was immediate.  Another, even larger mass conference ensued, 
this time in Najaf, and Faisal sent his closest aides to support the gathering.  Churchill 
began to consider forcing Faisal’s abdication and handing the throne to his brother 
Abdallah or even to the prime minister, Naqib al-Kaylani.124  On the morning of the 
anniversary, Cox and Bell headed over to the palace to pay their respects and were treated 
to chants of ‘Down with Britain; Down with the Mandate!’ by the large crowd in front of 
the palace.125  Cox was furious and convinced that members of the king’s entourage had 
orchestrated the chants.  The following day, before any final decision could be made 
concerning Faisal’s political future, the king came down with acute appendicitis (the 
operation was performed the very next day).  Cox was able to seize the moment, 
assuming full interim powers, suppressing the main opposition newspapers and radical 
parties that had just formed, and exiling the seven most prominent opposition leaders.   
During Faisal’s month-long convalescence, cables crossed back and forth between 
Churchill and Cox.  Neither was disposed to force Faisal from the throne.  Cox felt that 
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Faisal was too ‘morally weak and unstable’ to make a good king; ‘a subtle and 
accomplished schemer and a very bad judge of men’ who aspired, with the help of his 
court, to become ‘an irresistible autocrat’.126  The solution was simply to reduce the 
influence of the court, limit Faisal’s powers, and mold him into a docile supporter of 
British power.  Churchill ultimately approved this plan, as any retreat from Britain’s Iraq 
policy at this stage could prove publicly humiliating.  He advised Cox to impress on 
Faisal that ‘he was brought to Iraq not to play the autocrat but to settle down into a sober 
and constitutional monarch friendly to us.’127  With London’s full support, Cox persuaded 
the Naqib to sign the draft treaty.  He then visited Faisal and told him that Britain would 
brook no more delays and expected Faisal to cease flirting with opposition forces.  Faisal 
conceded, realizing he still lacked a strong support base, and the draft treaty was 
published in Baghdad in early October.  The next step was to organize elections for the 
constituent assembly so the treaty could actually be ratified and Iraq’s constitution, the 
Organic Law, approved.  This, too, was destined not to go smoothly as Cox’s draconian 
measures against the opposition failed in their intent.  Overall leadership of the anti-
mandate/anti-treaty opposition simply shifted to the mujtahids of Kadhimain and Najaf. 
Fatwas were widely circulated banning any and all participation in elections to a 
constituent assembly.  Grand Ayatollah al-Isfahani even declared that those who did 
participate were apostates whose wives must desert them forthwith.128  Ayatollah al-
Khalisi not only attacked the religious legality of the elections but also launched attacks 
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against the British, the Naqib, and Faisal, accusing the latter of betraying the 
commitments he had made when he first arrived in Iraq.  Even in Baghdad, where the 
population consisted primarily of Jews, Christians, and Sunnis, the process stalled and 
collapsed.  Christian leaders in Mosul also urged their followers to boycott the 
elections.129  The Residency decided a stronger personality was needed as prime minister 
and removed its support from the Naqib, who subsequently resigned and was replaced in 
November 1922 by ‘Abd al-Muhsin al-Sa’adoun.130   
At the same time, events outside Iraq provided additional cause for concern.  
Mustafa Kemal’s rejuvenated Turkish Army routed the Greeks and turned to confront the 
Anglo-French troops holding the Dardanelles Straits.  The British public was adamantly 
opposed to another conflict and the way was paved for a new treaty with Turkey, 
replacing the unsigned Treaty of Sèvres.  The Chanak Crisis, as it was called, precipitated 
the downfall of Lloyd George’s government and Bonar Law stepped in, delaying any 
ratification of the treaty on the British end while the new government dealt with a loud 
press campaign along with political grumbling, both questioning the continued military 
presence and expenditure in Iraq and calling for immediate withdrawal.131  Cox returned 
to London for consultations with the new colonial secretary (the Duke of Devonshire 
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replaced Winston Churchill) and Sir Henry Dobbs took his place in Baghdad as Acting 
High Commissioner.  Turkish forces were massed along the borders of Mosul and by 
January 1923 invasion appeared immanent, with no guarantee that the Turks would stop 
at Mosul and not march on Baghdad itself.  The Iraqi army was in no position to repulse 
an invasion and Faisal, concerned the British would not defend Iraq as there was 
discussion in Britain of ceding Mosul to Turkey, changed tactics, passing along to the 
Residency a list of known sympathizers with the Turkish cause for possible 
deportation.132 
Turkish propaganda was active in Iraq, calling on fellow Muslims to support 
Turkey rather than the British ‘infidel’; nicely ironic given Mustafa Kemal’s determined 
secularism. Yet it resonated among the religious groups in Iraq who still did not think in 
terms of nationalist categories or willingly accept the idea of an inclusive, nonsectarian 
nation-state.  The mujtahids in Khadimain issued another fatwa, this one forbidding the 
defense of the country in case of a Turkish invasion, a direct challenge to the Palace, the 
Residency, and the struggling government.133  The British advisor to the minister of 
interior wanted immediate arrests and deportations of the offending mujtahids, as did al-
Sa’adoun, on the grounds that they were Persian subjects, but Faisal was still unwilling to 
set himself so openly against the mujtahids.   
A crisis was averted when Bonar Law’s government determined in special 
committee that it would be too dangerous to withdraw from Iraq as the likely result 
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would be the absorption of the entire country by Turkey which, in turn, would threaten 
Britain’s lines of communication with India and contribute to Muslim unrest on the 
Subcontinent.  Eventually the threat subsided and the Treaty of Lausanne was signed in 
July, with the final determination of Mosul province turned over to the League of 
Nations.134  More to placate the press and Parliament than anything else, it was 
determined that the treaty with Iraq would last for four years rather than twenty, paving 
the way for Iraq to enter the League of Nations much earlier.  Faisal immediately hailed 
this as a major step towards reducing British influence and pushed to restart the stalled 
elections.  He set out on a full tour of the country, meeting with sheikhs, merchants, and 
mujtahids to convince them of the latest progress and ensure that they participated in the 
elections but al-Khalisi and the other Ayatollahs only reaffirmed their earlier fatwas. 
Al-Sa’adoun, the cabinet, and the Residency had had enough.  While Faisal was 
still touring the south amendments were made to the criminal code that gave the 
government power to deport foreign criminals.  Although a number of the Ayatollahs, 
such as al-Khalisi, were Arabs who had only added Persian nationality during the later 
Ottoman period to avoid conscription, they were all treated as foreign subjects and 
arrested.135  Despite Faisal’s last-minute cable to al-Sa’adoun requesting that he leave al-
Khalisi alone, and Sir Henry Dobbs’ belated concern regarding the political ramifications 
of his exile, al-Sa’adoun was determined, stressing that al-Khalisi’s activities, and those 
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of his supporters, threatened the credibility of the state.136  Al-Khalisi was arrested at his 
home and placed in a first-class carriage of a special train that took him to Basra where 
he was then placed in a first-class cabin on a steamer to Aden.137  He eventually went to 
Iran.  Other ayatollahs and mujtahids (led by al-Isfahani and al-Na’ini) went very 
publicly into self-imposed exile in Iran, in protest at the treatment of al-Khalisi.  Dobbs’ 
forecast of ‘a fearsome squeal from Tehran’ failed to materialize, likely because of the 
distraction surrounding Reza Khan’s rise to power, which occurred simultaneously with 
these events.138 
Al-Sa’adoun’s decision (with the backing of the cabinet and the Residency) 
solved the immediate crisis but it widened the sectarian fissures in Iraq.  Once settled in 
Iran, the Ayatollahs began a campaign against Faisal and the Iraqi government, stating 
they would not return to Iraq unless Faisal abdicated and appealing to the now-impotent 
Ottoman caliph “for the deliverance of Iraq from the foreigners…and from Faisal and his 
father who came to dominate over the Moslems by fighting in the ranks of the Allies and 
by disuniting the Moslems under the cloak of Arab nationalism in disobedience of the 
order of God.”139  Simultaneously a press campaign was launched in Baghdad, 
condemning the Ayatollahs and their challenge to the government and raising the specter 
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of fifth columnists and evil religious elements conspiring against the national interests of 
Iraq and the Arabs.140 
The British ambassador in Iran, Sir Percy Lorraine, traveled to Baghdad to 
convince the Iraqi government to allow the Ayatollahs to return before they stirred up 
anti-British trouble in Iran but Al-Sa’adoun remained firm.  Faisal, on the other hand, 
believed the Ayatollahs’ bluster would wane once they realized that prolonged absence 
from the shrine cities would lessen their influence (and income).  He also felt that the 
Iranian Ayatollahs would soon tire of having their rivals for supporters and influence so 
close to their own bases.  Additionally, he guessed they would grow uncomfortable with 
the modernizing policies of Reza Khan, which were closer in spirit to Mustafa Kemal’s 
approach than Faisal’s own more cautious, traditionalist tendencies.  Finally, Faisal still 
sought to build a support base among the Shi’a and knew he needed the backing of the 
mujtahids if he expected to succeed.  He began secret negotiations for their return 
following the elections (in letters later intercepted by the R.A.F.) on the understanding 
that they would abstain from political involvement in future.141  Needless to say, this 
maneuvering, when disclosed, heightened tensions between the Residency and Faisal and 
between Faisal and al-Sa’adoun.   
The final hurdle to restarting the elections was Kurdish unrest in northeastern 
Iraq, centering in the town of Suleimaniya.  The uprising was quickly put down by an 
intensive R.A.F. bombing campaign but the status of the region remained uncertain.  
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British policy aimed to keep the Kurdish districts loosely tied to the government in 
Baghdad, in keeping with Mosul’s traditional semi-independent status under the Ottoman 
Empire and because the British wanted to maintain a weak centralized government. 
Faisal and his cabinet, however, wanted to bind the northern region to the central 
government and create a strong, centralized state.  Faisal worried that other nationalist 
insurrections might erupt, endangering the future status of the entire Mosul province and 
encouraging the League of Nations to hand it off to Turkey.142   As a result he persuaded 
the cabinet to pass a resolution confirming the central government would leave the Kurds 
to appoint their own officials and would not force the region to adopt Arabic in its official 
correspondence.  Al-Askari later suggested a policy of exchanges of officials between 
north and south and even of removing the seat of government from Baghdad to 
Rawanduz during the summer months, to accelerate assimilation and unification.143  
These measures met with approval and the path was clear to calling the elections that 
marked the first step to ratifying the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty.   
Behind this superficial unanimity lay another power struggle, between Faisal and 
al-Sa’adoun.  Just as the Naqib had proved (until they dropped him) a strong supporter of 
the British, al-Sa’adoun also supported the British, feeling that the lack of domestic 
resources and the number of opponents to a nationally united, independent Iraq left the 
government with no choice but to cooperate fully with the Residency.144  Dobbs, in 
particular, favoured al-Sa’adoun and, as he was now High Commissioner (Cox having 
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finally stepped down) Faisal saw his prime minister as a potential rival to his own slowly 
increasing stature and was determined to remove him from the cabinet.  In this he 
succeeded and was finally able to get his own man, Ja’far al-‘Askari, into the post.   
Faisal would execute this sort of maneuver a number of times over the next 
decade as he sought to break up alliances among his coterie of officers and remove any 
members of cabinet who appeared poised to grab more power or influence than he 
himself held.  Dobbs, like Cox before him, saw through these efforts and grew 
increasingly frustrated, the more so as Faisal also countenanced land grabs (illicit 
transfers of titles on state agricultural lands) by his officers and administrators in a ploy 
to create a new landed class that could effectively challenge the power of the established 
landed classes who tended to support the British.145  Dobbs cabled the Colonial Office 
that ‘we cannot expect a second providential attack of appendicitis’ and warned that it 
might be necessary to force Faisal to abdicate if he would not behave.146 
Faisal may not have been as authoritarian in nature as Mustafa Kemal, Reza Shah, 
or Amanullah Khan but he was no less determined to achieve independence, stability, and 
control.  The difficulty lay chiefly in transcending community loyalties and identities by 
forging a national consciousness that emphasized the bonds of territory (though a large 
part of that territory remained in question until 1926) and a common nationhood while 
still paying respect, as Faisal did, to the diverse sects, religions, and ethnicities contained 
within the territory.  In this he was almost continuously at odds with his Sunni Arab 
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officers who, acutely aware of their numerical disadvantage and overtly impatient with 
those they considered less educated or less modern, were equally determined to strong-
arm the country into a modern nation-state by means of a strident Arab nationalist 
rhetoric.  Such tactics led to a series of crises in 1927, over al-Askari’s introduction of a 
conscription bill and al-Husri’s rigid administrative control of the school system.   
As mentioned earlier, a number of Faisal’s officers had pushed for conscription 
from the inception of the monarchy, with the approval of Faisal (who considered the 
army ‘the spinal column for nation-forming’) and a number of the British military 
members stationed in Iraq.147  The Residency and Colonial Office, however, remained 
firmly opposed to the idea.  Dobbs, in particular, was convinced it was little more than a 
ruse on the part of Faisal’s Sunni supporters to create the means to install an autocracy in 
Iraq. When the bill was introduced the minister of education at that time, a prominent 
Shi’i, resigned in protest.  Reaction in the south was fierce and it was clear that many of 
the Shi’a were of the same opinion as Dobbs, that the army would prove little more than 
an instrument of the ruling clique in Baghdad.148  Faisal sought to defuse the mounting 
tension by giving the existing army units names that would resonate among the Shi’a but 
with the officer corps composed entirely of Sunnis, this had little effect.149  When several 
tribes along the Tigris and in the countryside surrounding Basra threatened to “leave Iraq 
or take on Persian or Nejdi nationality to avoid being conscripted,” much as they had 
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done during Ottoman times, Faisal realized his government had overreached and the 
conscription bill was postponed.150 
Faisal championed greater inclusion and employment of Shi’a in government, 
often against the wishes of his ministers, and worked assiduously to ameliorate the sense 
of grievance towards the monarchy that simmered in the wake of the events surrounding 
the arrest and deportation of al-Khalisi.  Unfortunately his desire to construct a sense of 
community based on military service and education were viewed with suspicion by many 
of the Shi’a throughout the 1920s, as seen in the resistance to the conscription bill and 
also to government sponsored education.  However, in the latter case it may have been as 
much resistance to Sati’ al-Husri’s capacity for tactlessness as to his promotion of a 
secular Arab nationalism.151 
To assist his friend and patron, the former Ottoman bureaucrat was determined to 
play his part in uniting Iraq under Faisal’s rule by inculcating an awareness and 
enthusiasm for a national community, one with a shared historical, cultural, and linguistic 
memory.  He argued that ‘a single language and a single history’ were the building blocks 
of the nation.152 
  The unity in these two fields leads to a unity of feelings and desires, a 
unity of sufferings and hopes, a unity of culture…and in this fashion the people 
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believe they are members of one nation, distinguished from other nations.  
However, neither religion nor the state, nor the economic life entered into, are the 
basic elements of a nation. And neither is geographic territory…the language 
forms the nation’s soul and its life, the history forms the nation’s memory and its 
consciousness.”153 
 
The school, rather than the home, the family, the tribe, or even the territory, would 
function as the inculcator of a distinct Iraqi nationalist culture.  Properly trained teachers 
would instruct students in the superiority of order, discipline, co-operation, and the role 
of the individual in service to the nation, emphasizing  ‘the idea of the unity of the Arab 
nation and the Arabism of Iraq…from the beginning’.154  They would also instill an 
appropriate love of the nation through lessons in the common ties of language and 
history. 
To this end, in 1923 al-Husri implemented a nation-wide curriculum for primary 
schools.  Introduction of the English language was postponed to the second year of 
schooling in favor of instruction in the ‘history of the fatherland and the nation’s past’, 
designed to serve the more immediate purpose of ‘strengthening the patriotic and national 
sentiments in the hearts of the students’.155  Although al-Husri recognized that tailoring 
historical instruction to suit national political aims could be dangerous, he maintained 
that it was appropriate “‘to proceed in the light of the demands of ‘patriotic education’ in 
the matter of the events and facts which we can put before the gaze of our students in the 
time fixed for the study of history’.”156  So it was hardly surprising that a student reported 
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to British administrators in the 1930s that he graduated from secondary school in 
Baghdad believing any Iraqi “can beat ten Englishmen in any kind of fighting, through 
his bravery and physical strength, and Iraqis actually proved it in the ‘Revolution’ of 
1920 (when) many Arabs captured British cannons and artillery armed only with 
clubs.”157 
Creating the new Arab nation that al-Husri envisioned required a significant 
increase in social discipline, which implied the introduction and application of military 
drill and conscription.  Al-Husri was convinced that only by removing the child from his 
surroundings and subjecting him to a rigorous blend of nationalist and military training, 
could his education be successful.158  The dependence of this method on standardized 
education was apparent and al-Husri refused to allow the opening of either new Shi‘a or 
Jewish-run secondary schools or training colleges outside Baghdad, particularly in the 
rural areas of the south where the majority of the students would certainly be Shi‘a, a fact 
that might encourage a dangerous sectarianism among the teaching staff.159  Nationalist 
subjects were introduced that purported to teach Arab history in a secular fashion and 
attempted to suppress any sense of distinction, historic or religious, between Sunnis and 
Shi‘a.  This naturally caused resentment as the Iraqi Shi‘a felt the propagation of a 
supranational Arabism was intended primarily for the support of the Sunni minority in 
Baghdad and neglected their tribal origins, placing them in the position of having to 
prove their ethnic ‘credentials’ to a group of ex-Ottoman officials, some of whom (al-
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Husri in particular) could not even claim the country or any of the former vilayets as their 
places of origin.  Indeed, the Sunni administrators in Baghdad, including al-Husri, did not 
hesitate to question the loyalty as well as the ethnic origins of the Shi’a population, using 
the term shu‘ubi to designate them, thereby insinuating their Iranian inclinations.160  This, 
coupled with al-Husri’s refusal to allow a more decentralized educational system that 
would address the needs of the considerable rural (and Shi’a) population in the south, 
proved a constant source of irritation between the Shi’a and successive Sunni 
governments.161 
Al-Husri was determined to instill a national idea that stretched beyond 
geographical boundaries at a time when Iraq was still struggling simply to delimit its 
borders let alone define itself as a nation.  His efforts exacerbated underlying political 
and social disparities that would continue to fester for decades, somehow diminishing his 
boast that he intended to ‘strengthen the sentiments of nationalism among the sons of Iraq 
and spread among them the belief in the unity of the Arab nation’.162  Both al-Husri and 
his successor (Muhammad Fadhil al-Jamali) actively recruited teachers from Syria and 
Palestine, relying on them to minimize local concerns and to emphasize Iraqi nationalism 
within the greater Arab nation.163  However, the events of 1927 proved that local 
concerns were not easily suppressed. 
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One of al-Husri’s recruits was Anis Zakaria Nsouli, a Lebanese Sunni Arab and a 
recent graduate of the American University in Beirut.  Al-Husri installed him as a history 
instructor in the Baghdad Central Secondary School.  Nsouli wrote a polemical book 
entitled The Umayyad State in Syria, which was printed in 1926 by a local publishing 
house for general readership, and also earmarked by the government for school-wide 
distribution.164  The book glorified the Caliph Muawiya, a detested ruler in the Shi’a 
litany, and belittled Imam Ali; it also practically dismissed Imam Hussein’s martyrdom, 
calling him a rebel against the legitimate government.  Finally, Nsouli dedicated his work 
to the modern-day heirs to the Umayyad dynasty, i.e. Faisal and his government.  The 
reaction was instantaneous. 
The minister of education, Sayyid ‘Abd al-Mahdi, ordered Nsouli’s immediate 
dismissal and banned the book from the curriculum.  The other teachers that al-Husri had 
recruited from the Levant protested formally and accused the minister of presiding over 
an inquisition.  There was a large student demonstration in Baghdad (both from the 
secondary schools as well as the teacher training college) demanding Nsouli’s 
reinstatement.  The demonstration turned into a procession, which marched on the 
Ministry of Education where it clashed with the police prior to dispersing.  From the mid-
Euphrates region straight through to the south there were demonstrations supporting the 
minister’s decision and protesting the book’s publication.  A Commission of Inquiry 
subsequently set up by al-Mahdi upheld his decision and recommended suspension for a 
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number of the student demonstrators in Baghdad and the dismissal of all the teachers 
recruited by al-Husri. 
The events surrounding the conscription bill and the publication and 
dissemination of Nsouli’s history exposed the sectarian fissures that continued to form 
within Iraq despite Faisal’s efforts.  His mild, religiously inclusive, nationalism was 
entirely at odds with al-Husri’s (and the other Sunni officers) more militant, racialist, and 
secular nationalism that simply dismissed local loyalties and traditions, not to mention 
sectarian distinctions.  Faisal had just been given cause to celebrate as the League of 
Nations finally granted Mosul to Iraq, settling the country’s northern borders and 
allowing him the hope that he could convince the various populations to gradually unify, 
while his Director-General of Education was simultaneously imposing a curriculum 
designed to instill the notion that nationalism was secular and supra-territorial. 
The raids from Nejd continued apace, even after ibn Saud had signed two border 
accords with Iraq (they wouldn’t cease until 1930 when the two kings met on shipboard 
in the Shatt al-Arab and finally negotiated a lasting truce).  Relations with Iran faired no 
better as neither the Residency nor the Sunni officers and administrators ever ceased to 
believe in the “malevolency of the ‘Persian divines’ and their hold over the ‘ignorant 
masses’ and tribal sheikhs of southern Iraq.”165  Despite the fact that Faisal very clearly 
did not share in the overtly racial nationalism of his coterie (nor did he define Iraqi 
nationalism or patriotism in terms of hostility to Iran), economic trade and relations 
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between the two countries limped along until 1932 when Faisal’s efforts to strengthen 
ties bore fruit and he was finally able to pay a state visit to Iran. 
As it shared borders with Turkey and Iran, Iraq had two close examples of ‘new’ 
countries that had rid themselves, to varying degrees, of control by foreign powers.  But 
neither Turkey nor Iran had to contend with artificially imposed borders or an 
internationally sanctioned oversight of foreign protection and instruction.  Since his 
arrival in Iraq, Faisal maneuvered constantly against the British for the latitude and 
control to govern the country he’d been granted.  He achieved this through an exhausting 
combination of politics, negotiation, cajolery, and intrigue that caused the British on 
several occasions to reconsider their initial choice of Faisal as ruler.  ‘The opinion is 
widely expressed in the most unexpected circles that the disappearance of the dangerous 
neurotic is after all the only solution to the present problems.’166 
British letters, memoirs, and dispatches from the mandate period frequently 
described Faisal as ‘duplicitous’, ‘childish’, ‘obstinate’, ‘secretive’, ‘deceitful’, and any 
manner of epithets that appeared in direct contrast to the romantic and flowery language 
used to describe his physical attributes, his ‘piercing eyes’, ‘’high, lustrous forehead’, 
‘noble carriage’, his ability to speak ‘in the great tongue of the desert’, ‘the finest living 
representative of his race’ and, last but not least, ‘he looked like Christ’.  Faisal was 
determined to rule but acknowledged that lack of resources and the gravity of Iraq’s 
financial straits, initially, made complete rupture with the British impossible.  The 
expulsion of the mujtahids and ayatollahs added to the country’s financial difficulties as 
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pilgrimage and corpse traffic declined precipitously.  Continual disruptions to harvests 
due to floods, droughts, disease, and Ikhwan raids also contributed to the country’s poor 
economic state and increased its dependency on the British presence. 
Faisal also faced a constant battle for control over the emergent Sunni political 
class, which, in turn, was riddled with rivalries and conspiracies.  He expended 
considerable energy to maintain their focus on the Palace rather than the Residency.  The 
various alliances he joined and abandoned (though never so completely that he couldn’t 
revisit them) confused the British and led to their frustration with his seeming 
inconstancy but Faisal’s efforts were merely directed at ensuring his position and control 
over his government.  That he achieved his status as Iraq’s key political figure within a 
decade was no small feat considering he began as a complete outsider hampered by 
foreign control and a fractious following. 
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Chapter V: Struggling Towards Independence 
 
It is fair to suggest that the R.A.F. was the glue that held the country together for 
much of its first decade.  It is also fair to suggest this might not have been entirely 
necessary had the Colonial Office been less intransigent in its policy during the mandate.  
A convoluted system of government had emerged not unlike the dual responsibility 
exercised in the Indian Army, which largely contributed to the disastrous experiences of 
the Mesopotamia Expeditionary Force in the lead up to the 6th (Poona) Division’s 
surrender under General Townshend at Kut al-Amara in April 1916; except in Iraq it was 
two ministers for every position rather than two positions under one minister.167  Iraqi 
ministers and government officials were constantly watched and frequently contradicted 
by their British advisors, creating tensions that only increased as Iraqis grew more 
accustomed to administration and power.   
The Iraqi government was responsible for running the ports and railroads, 
including covering their deficits but it was the British who owned them.  According to the 
military arrangements, Iraq could declare martial law but could not administer it.  The 
army (such as it was) could not be deployed without the assent of the British High 
Commissioner.  Foreign nationals had extraterritorial rights in Iraq, which were not 
reciprocated for Iraqis.  The Iraqi budget had to cover half the costs of the British 
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Residency on an annual basis but the Iraqi government had no control over how the 
money was spent.168  To his credit, Dobbs understood how untenable this position was for 
Faisal and tried to convince the Colonial Office to soften its position much as Cox had 
done with regard to the language of the mandate, with as little success.  According to the 
Colonial Office, grievances over the structure of dual responsibility were baseless, 
existing ‘only in the minds of fervid patriots’.169 
As with the earlier Chanak Crisis, matters within Iraq were resolved by external 
events.  Article 3 of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1926 raised the possibility of reviewing 
Iraq’s progress at four-year intervals.170  Faisal had insisted on this provision, arguing it 
would be difficult to pass a treaty prolonging the mandate without some concession to 
mitigate possible nationalist uproar.  He intended to use the stipulated reviews to further 
his goal of hastening admission to the League of Nations and, consequently, achieving 
full independence.  To this end, Faisal focused his energies following the ratification on 
widening his authority in Iraq and loosening the British grip over its administration.  For 
the British, however, Article 3 was purely cosmetic.  After four months spent in London 
in late 1927 negotiating directly with the Colonial Office, Faisal failed to secure his 
primary objective – that Britain would concede independence for Iraq as early as 1928 
and allow her to enter the League of Nations.  Indeed, at the first meeting in London’s 
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Hyde Park Hotel, Faisal was handed an aide-memoire criticizing his ‘interference in 
domestic affairs and his role in encouraging anti-British sentiment in Iraq’.171  The note 
concluded by urging Faisal to accept the role the British intended for him, namely, that of 
constitutional monarch, and leave the running of the country to his government (i.e., to 
the British advisors standing behind every Iraqi minister).172 
Recognizing the futility of gaining British concessions to his demands, Faisal 
altered course and sought the removal of the High Commissioner’s veto rights, aware that 
just prior to his arrival in London Britain had negotiated a treaty recognizing Ibn Saud’s 
full independence.  This too was rejected, as the office of High Commissioner was a key 
prop in Britain’s control of Iraq.  The Colonial Office’s view on the matter was 
strengthened by exaggerated reports from the Residency in Baghdad that ‘the Iraqi public 
would be alarmed at Britain’s withdrawal and the country would become unstable.’173  
Ultimately, all the British would agree to was a public acceptance that Iraq was an 
‘independent sovereign state’, which counted for little when set against the High 
Commissioner’s veto powers and the fact that the British still withheld support of Iraq’s 
application to the League of Nations for full membership.174  Such a nominal gain elicited 
little interest in Baghdad and opposition to both the British and Faisal increased. 
Worn out by his constant confrontations with Faisal and the Colonial Office, 
Dobbs retired in March 1929 and was replaced by Sir Gilbert Clayton, an old friend of 
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Faisal’s.175  Clayton’s arrival paved the way for an accommodation between London and 
Baghdad, as did another change in Britain’s government.  A new colonial secretary was 
appointed, Sidney James Webb, Lord Passfield, a socialist reformer and co-founder of the 
London School of Economics and the New Statesman magazine.  Clayton’s suggestion 
that British interests would be best served if concessions were forthcoming fell on 
sympathetic ears, as did his insistence that the situation in Iraq was ‘gradually 
deteriorating as a result of doubt and uncertainty as to the HM Government [sic] real 
policy’.176  For good measure he raised the spectre of another 1920-style uprising and the 
British government decided it was finally prepared to recommend Iraq’s entry into the 
League of Nations in 1932.  Unfortunately, Clayton didn’t live to see his suggestions bear 
fruit.  He collapsed and died on the polo grounds at the age of 54, a day after the Colonial 
Office telegraphed their decision. 
Faisal understood that Britain’s promise to support Iraq did not spell the end of 
their influence in the country, nor was he seeking independence on that level.  Iraq would 
be dependent on British support (economic, military, and diplomatic) for a number of 
years to come but political pre-eminence could not be achieved with the continued 
intervention of high commissioners in internal affairs that, rightly, should fall under the 
exclusive purview of the king.  The new High Commissioner, Sir Francis Humphreys, 
was as sympathetic as his predecessor and agreed to work with Faisal and his new 
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cabinet.  For the first time the entire cabinet, with the exception of the minister of 
education, had been handpicked by Faisal.  He chose Nuri al-Sa’id as his prime minister 
and filled the other posts with ex-sharifian officers who served with him either during the 
Arab Revolt or in Syria.  Within three months Faisal and Nuri, working closely with 
Humphreys, crafted a new draft treaty that was sent to London for approval. 
The new treaty granted Faisal much of what he wanted for Iraq: Britain’s 
recognition of the country’s independence; an Iraqi army responsible for maintaining 
order and defense; and the withdrawal of British forces with the exception of two air 
bases.  In exchange Iraq agreed to maintain a twenty-five year treaty of alliance with 
Britain, and the British ambassador to Iraq would receive privileged status over other 
ambassadors.  Iraq would continue to employ British advisors in preference to advisors 
from other countries and the British would provide the Iraqi army with equipment and 
training.  London agreed to the terms and the text of the new Anglo-Iraqi Treaty was 
published in London on 18 July 1930 and in the Baghdad press on the following day.   
News of the treaty failed to meet with widespread approval.  Faisal’s lean towards 
autocracy, though stemming from a desire to control a negotiation process whose 
outcome he considered to be of fundamental significance to the country’s future, had not 
gone unnoticed.177  The Kurds worried that independence would presage eventual 
subservience to a “blatantly centralized and Arab nationalist state.”178  The Shi’a feared 
ratification would serve as a prelude to mass conscription.  The nationalists were opposed 
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to continuation of British influence in any form, though Faisal felt many of them would 
change loyalties in an instant at the offer of government positions.179  Faced with 
increasing agitation against ratification of the treaty and concern over political enemies 
even in his handpicked cabinet, Faisal left for an extended rest cure in Europe, instructing 
his brother Ali, as regent in his absence, to dissolve the Majlis and call for new elections, 
leaving Nuri as the public face of the Iraqi negotiators for the treaty.180  Nuri set to work 
compiling a list of pro-government candidates whose election would ensure an 
unquestionable majority for ratification.  He left little to chance, shutting down nationalist 
newspapers, harassing opposition leaders, and using the land laws to alternately bribe and 
threaten rural sheikhs with grants or withdrawals of tracts of state land.181  Elections were 
held in October, returning a chamber with an overwhelming government majority and on 
16 November 1930, the new Anglo-Iraqi Treaty was ratified. 
Unfortunately, Faisal won his freedom from British oversight during a period of 
increasing unrest and economic crisis.  Iraq’s agricultural output had slumped amid 
severe local droughts and a collapse of world commodity prices, causing tribal unrest, 
particularly in the mid-Euphrates region and throughout the south.  For the first time 
Faisal, rather than simply his government, was attacked.  Shi’a grievances ran deep and 
only worsened in the months following Nuri’s restrictions and clampdowns on political 
activity and the press.  Despite touring the towns of Hilla, Najaf, and Karbala 
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accompanied by the two Shi’a members of government (Sayyid Muhammad al-Sadr, 
head of the Senate and ‘Abd al-Hussein al-Chalabi, once again minister of education), 
Faisal was unsuccessful in mollifying the feelings of alienation among the Shi’a.  His 
personal prestige had definitely waned.  Further harm befell his reputation when four 
anonymous letters circulated in Baghdad accusing him of conducting secret liaisons with 
women from prominent families, of exhibiting favoritism in government appointments, 
and of misusing public funds.  The letters demanded the dissolution of the cabinet and the 
abolition of the monarchy in favor of a republic.182  The American chargé d’affaires in 
Baghdad, a witness to the ensuing scandal, commented “although the King has never 
been popular, he has not been very unpopular until recent months.”183 
In July of 1931, a general strike was called in Baghdad that lasted fourteen days 
and turned the city into a ghost town, as all the shops and markets remained closed.  
Instigated by a feared increase to a municipality tax on merchants and crafts, the protests 
quickly spread throughout the city, becoming violent when demonstrators clashed openly 
with police.  Faisal and Nuri had left the country for a state visit to Turkey the day before 
the strike, leaving Faisal’s brother Ali acting as regent once more.  The demonstrators 
soon merged with the political opposition, which used the strike to flay Faisal and Nuri’s 
government for accepting the unequal treaty of 1930.  Ali was incapable of handling the 
protests and Faisal quickly dispatched Nuri to Baghdad to regain control.  The RAF was 
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forced to fly several sorties over the mid-Euphrates region to dissuade the tribesmen from 
joining in and turning the strike into a full-scale insurrection.184 
Despite the general disapproval of the treaty and the incessant rivalries and power 
struggles among the cabinet and opposition parties, as well as Faisal’s increasing distrust 
of Nuri’s political power, he made no attempt to dislodge Nuri over the next few months 
or to dismiss the cabinet.  His instinct was not to destroy political opponents but rather to 
bring them into the fold.  Faisal understood how thin the political class was in Iraq; 
maneuvering constantly to redress large imbalances in power that might arise to threaten 
the status quo.185   His perseverance paid off when on 3 October 1932, Iraq was informed 
of its acceptance to the League of Nations.  The reaction throughout Iraq was supportive 
and Faisal’s personal popularity “grew accordingly in power and consequence.”186 
Although the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty was unequal in terms of the conditions 
imposed on Iraq by Britain, Faisal had certainly succeeded in freeing Iraq from the 
burdensome oversight of the British in its domestic affairs.  The country remained 
fragmented and insecure in many respects but he felt that at least now it had the freedom 
to chart its own political future, without severing ties to a power whose continuing 
support was essential for cementing Iraq’s stability and prosperity.187  Faisal had also 
succeeded in achieving dominance over the Sunni Arab, ex-sharifian political class, 
deftly shifting between alliances and playing rivalries off against one another to keep 
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political ambitions in check.  Unfortunately, just as he seemed to gain his full measure of 
political maturity, stress and lifestyle took their toll (he was a habitually heavy smoker) 
and Faisal died in Berne of heart failure at the age of 48, on 8 September 1933.  His plans 
to inculcate a sense of loyalty and belonging to the nation and to encourage participation 
in the national effort by improving educational standards within each community 
according to its needs and using the government to develop the shrine cities and improve 
their general condition remained unimplemented.188 
Shortly before his death Faisal expressed his concerns for Iraq in an eight-page 
memorandum he circulated among his administrators for discussion. 
 In this regard and with sadness, I have to say that it is my belief 
there is still no Iraqi people but unimaginable masses of human beings, 
devoid of any patriotic idea, imbued with religious traditions and 
absurdities, connected by no common tie, giving ear to evil, prone to 
anarchy, and perpetually ready to rise against any government whatever.  
Out of these masses we want to fashion a people which we would train, 
educate, and refine….The circumstances, being what they are, the 
immenseness of the efforts needed for this [can be imagined].189 
 
He argued for greater inclusion of the Shi’a and for building the nation slowly, taking 
into account the various traditions and needs of each community.  This was considerably 
different from Sati’ al-Husri’s efforts at nation building through radical, centrally 
imposed uniformity.  Faisal understood the danger that continued Shi’a alienation could 
pose to the success of the country.  Insofar as he succeeded in “placing the country’s 
foreign policy on a path it could follow for a long time” to the same extent he failed “in 
terms of domestic policy to resolve (the country’s) problems and to provide useful 
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guidance.”190  As the Sunni political class grew in strength following his death, they had 
little desire to make any major concessions to the Shi’a.  In this they adhered to the more 
traditional British practice of excluding the Shi’a from playing a major role in their own 
country, either individually or collectively.  But as Faisal had implied when arguing the 
need for a standing national army, 150,000 rifles among a group united in purpose would 
far outclass the British military in Iraq, much less an untried army of 15,000.191  
 The somewhat ephemeral nature of Faisal’s popularity and subsequent legacy 
within Iraq may be a reflection of his ultimate inability to bring his national project to 
fruition.  It can also be argued that the concession he really won was one of greater 
personal freedom for himself and his cabinet rather than freedom for the country.  A. J. 
Balfour wrote in 1919 that ‘no state can be described as really independent (when) 
supported, if the worst comes to the worst, by troops, aeroplanes and tanks.’192  Whatever 
the true nature of British-Iraqi relations following Iraq’s entry to the League, it was 
widely felt by Iraqis that the British still controlled their country.  The continued presence 
of two RAF bases likely contributed to this sentiment, along with the ‘special 
relationship’ with the British ambassador. 
 There were also no close or powerful advisors with the desire or ability to carry 
on Faisal’s ambitions for national cohesion after his death.  Ghazi, his son, “was in no 
position to fill the void that his (father’s) death caused” as a result of his “youth, 
                                                
190 Al-Suwaydi, 269-270.  
191 Batatu, 26 and 90. 
192 As quoted in Sluglett, 160.  
 72 
inexperience, and lack of sufficient intelligence and sophistication.”193  Much of Faisal’s 
own success with the various tribes, minorities, and individuals within the country, as 
well as without, was due in large part to “his character [which] had surpassed, if not 
obliterated, all other characters.”194  He remained a powerful figure to other countries in 
the region, a man of intelligence and natural authority, who commanded the respect and 
admiration not only of the general populace, but of the leaders as well, as witnessed by 
his reception every time he conducted state visits either to Iran, Turkey, or Palestine.195  
Even the public in France and Britain had grown enamored of his presence over time and 
his visits were celebrated with lavish fêtes.  In Iraq, however, personal political rivalries 
and resentments blossomed after 1933 and the country fell into a cycle of power grabs, 
demonstrations, and coups that even the violent overthrow of the monarchy in 1958 failed 
to satisfy.  Ultimately, nothing remained of Faisal’s careful regard for traditions and his 
pragmatically moderate approach to nation building. 
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